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The collapse of communism faced Poland and other former Soviet bloc countries with the 
need for a massive “institutional refit”, as regards both economic and political institutions.  
This paper describes where some of the key new institutions were derived from (either in the 
form of transplants from other countries, revivals of pre-communist domestic institutions or 
completely new local “institutional innovations”), and proposes some tentative views as to 
why the particular developments we observe took place, and whether they corresponded to 
needs at the time.  In the case of transplants, we attempt to explain why these were copied 
from one particular country rather than from others.  
 
 















Why  different  economies  grow  at  different  rates  is  one  of  the  most  important 
questions in economics. Barro’s (1991) classical paper on economic growth across the world 
introduced  dummies  for  sub-Saharan  Africa  and  Latin  America,  and  found  that  their 
coefficients  were  significant,  but  did  not  explain  why  this  was  the  case.  Many  empirical 
studies show that so-called ‘total factor productivity’ accounts for most of the observed cross-
country variations in income levels, yet, although it may well be more important than the 
accumulation of capital, population growth and even educational improvement, productivity is 
“the unexplained part of economic growth” (Easterly and Levine, 2002).  
One of the reasons for the presence of this “residual” in cross-country comparisons 
may  be  that  the  neoclassical  framework  ignores  institutions,  “the  humanly  devised 
constraints  that  structure  political,  economic  and  social  interaction”.  These  include  both 
“informal  constraints  (sanctions,  taboos,  customs,  traditions,  and  codes  of  conduct),  and 
formal rules (constitutions, laws, property rights)” (North 1991). Institutions are usually stable 
over  time  and  they  have  a  lasting  effect  that  may  explain  the  long-run  persistence  of 
discrepancies in economic performance. Two ways in  which the impact of institutions on 
growth can be introduced into standard models of economic growth are presented in the 
Appendix.   
The collapse of communism faced Poland and other former Soviet bloc countries with 
the need for a massive “institutional refit”, as the institutions that existed under communism 
were naturally largely unsuitable for needs of a market economy. It is the purpose of this 
paper to describe where these institutions were derived from (either in the form of transplants 
from  other  countries, revivals  of  pre-communist  domestic  institutions  or  local  “institutional 
innovations”) and to propose some tentative views as to why the particular developments we 
observe took place, and to what extent they corresponded to needs at the time.  In the case 
of transplants, one of the interesting questions is why they were copied from a particular 
country rather than from others.  






1. Previous research on the economic importance of 
institutions and institutional transplants 
 
Hayek (1960) argued that the common law is superior to the civil law in its economic 
effects,  not  so  much  because  of  substantively  different  legal  rules,  but  because  of  their 
differing assumptions about the rights of the individual and the state, which go back to the 
philosophical  writings of Locke and Hume on the one hand and Rousseau on the other. 
According to Posner, the efficiency of common law is due to the ability of judges to adapt old 
rules and create new ones suitable for new and difficult to predict circumstances.  
La  Porta,  Lopez-de-Silanes,  Shleifer  and  Vishny  (1997)  found that  “countries  with 
poorer investor protections, measured by both character of legal rules and the quality of law 
enforcement,  have  smaller  and  narrower  capital  markets.”  Countries  belonging  to  the 
“French  civil  law  school”  (a  subset  of  all  civil  law  countries)  have  the  weakest  investor 
protection and the least developed financial systems. “Common law” countries tend to have 
the  opposite  characteristics.  La  Porta  et  al.  (2004)  find  that,  thanks  to  greater  judicial 
independence,  common  law  countries  have  more  “economic  freedom”  (i.e.  protection  of 
property and contract rights) than others. They also point to the findings by King and Levine 
(1993)  and  subsequent  authors  indicating  that  financial  development  promotes  economic 
growth.  
Furthermore, Levine, Loayza and Beck (2000) found that, when they use legal school 
as an instrument for financial sector development, this instrumented financial development 
has a large and significant impact on economic growth over the 1960-95 period. Finally, 
Rostowski and Stasescu (2006) found that although legal school does not have a significant 
impact on growth, former British colonies grow significantly (and a lot) faster than former 
French  colonies  in  the  post-independence  period.  Thus  there  is  both  theoretical  and 
empirical work suggesting that, when institutions are transplanted, it matters which country or 
countries they are transplanted from.   
 
 
2. Historical background 
 
In 1989 Poland and other former Soviet bloc states faced several key tasks.  The two 
most pressing were, first, to restore macroeconomic stability and, second, to privatise state 
assets, which constituted the vast bulk of the productive capital of the economy. A third, less 
immediately  obvious  task,  was  to  create  the  laws  and  accompanying  institutions  of Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
enforcement that would sustain a macro-economically stable market economy that would 
generate sufficiently high levels of economic growth to allow the country to make up for the 
lost years of communism, by catching up with Western Europe.
1   
The three tasks were closely intertwined.  Inflationary pressure stemmed primarily 
from  the  existence  of  absolute  full  employment  under  communism.  Under  absolute  full 
employment  both  “vertical”  and  “upward  sloping”  models  of  the  Phillips  curve  lead  to 
explosively spiralling prices (Rostowski 1998a). This pressure had been restrained through 
administrative  price  controls,  which  over  the  years  had  led  to  massive  misallocation  of 
resources  at  the  micro-economic  level  and  to  generalised  shortages  (often  called 
“suppressed inflation”). At the same time, wage pressure from the fully employed workers, 
was restrained by the banning of trade unions and the repression of strikes by secret police 
action. When strikes were allowed, as during the so-called “Solidarity period” of 1980-1, while 
prices continued to be set centrally, shortages spiralled out of control.  
Markets cannot work without free prices, but free prices combined with absolute full 
employment can only lead to hyperinflation. Yet under conditions of hyperinflation it is also 
the case that prices cannot efficiently perform their function as signals of relative scarcity. 
Agents cannot be sure to what extent a given price change reflects the general movement in 
prices and to what extent it reflects changes in demand for or supply of the good in question. 
Thus absolute full employment had to be abolished for the market to begin to function in 
Poland.  
It was unclear to what extent managers of un-privatised state enterprises would be 
willing  to  sack  employees,  bringing  us  back  to  the  question  of  privatisation.  Yet  many 
methods  of  privatisation  were  themselves  unlikely  to  be  possible  unless  the  value  of 
privatised enterprises could be realistically assessed. This in turn required market clearing 
(i.e. free) yet stable prices (i.e. the mastering of high inflation).  
Moreover, state ownership of enterprises was not the only potential problem faced in 
attempting to end absolute full employment. For enterprises to sack workers it was likely that 
they needed to be subject to bankruptcy if they failed to meet their financial obligations. Yet 
most post-communist states had no bankruptcy law, and those that did had ones that left 
much to be desired, bringing us back to the need for new legal rules and their effective 
enforcement. Indeed, even if an efficient bankruptcy law existed, what good would it do if 
their were no mechanism to ensure that enterprises were forced to pay for the inputs they 
bought  with  money,  rather  than  relying  on  trade  credit  willingly  granted  to  them  by  their 
                                                 
1 Before the war many East European countries were no poorer than those in Western Europe. Thus, the Czech 
lands (Bohemia and Moravia) were as rich as France, richer than Germany and far richer than Austria, while 
Poland was richer than Spain and about as rich as Italy. Estonia was far richer than Finland.    Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
friends  from  other  state  enterprises  (Rostowski,  1998b)?  –  which  brings  us  back  to  the 
question of privatisation. 
The foregoing description may seem to suggest that it was a miracle that any former 
communist economy managed to transform itself successfully into a stable market economy. 
And that is without mentioning the problems of massive foreign debt, immature new political 
and business elites (or corrupt old ones) or the need for a simultaneous political transition to 
democracy, in countries that had suffered from 40 or 70 years of totalitarianism, and often 
had previously had little experience of either democracy or the rule of law. Yet, despite these 
quite abominable “initial conditions” most of the countries have succeeded in their transitions 
(both economic and political) from communism.   
In  each  country  in  which  the  transition  succeeded  there  was  some  “chink”  in  the 
“vicious  circle  of  impossibility”  described  above,  which  seemed  to  require  that  for  any 
problem to solved, all had to be solved simultaneously. In the case of Poland the “chink” was 
the existence of a formal legal structure for the independence and corporate governance of 
state enterprises that was based on elected workers councils and on the existence, even 
under communism, of quite a large private sector (both in agriculture and outside of it).  In 
Hungary, it was the willingness of the political elite to acquiesce in the selling of almost the 
whole  of  the  industrial  sector  to  foreign  investors.  In  Russia,  it  was  the  political  elite’s 
acquiescence  in  massive  “nomenklatura  privatisation”,  in  which  the  persistence  of 
hyperinflation and “arrested transformation” actually played a crucial part (J.Hellman, 1998).  
The presence of “chinks in the cycle of impossibility” in so many countries, suggests 
that  something  was  driving  political  and  economic  systems  towards  sustainable  (if  not 
necessarily optimal) solutions.  In certain cases, such as Russia, this sustainability has not 
included proper democracy as well as a functioning market economy. 
 
 
3. Policies vs. institutions in the transition from communism: 
some problems and definitions 
 
Glaeser et al. (2004) are critical of explanations of growth based on differences in 
institutions, first, because of the subjective nature of most of the institutional indicators used 
in the literature, and second, because of the strong influence of human capital stock on the 
very different ways in which quite similar institutions actually operate.
2 They therefore argue 
that it is policies that respect property rights and encourage education that determine growth. 
However, Rostowski and Stasescu (2006) argue that it is hard to distinguish clearly between 
                                                 
2 Glaeser and Saks (2006) argue that levels of corruption (which importantly determine how formal institutions 
actually operate) differ across US states as a function of their level of education. Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
economic policies and institutions.  For example, are the rights to price stability and to trade 
freely “policies” or “institutions”?  Is an efficient system of universal schooling a “policy” or an 
“institution”? 
Rostowski and Stasescu therefore suggest that institutions should be distinguished 
from policies through their far greater persistence (or even better, through the expectation of 
their future persistence).
3  Thus, a short period of stable prices or of a fixed exchange rate 
should be thought of as a policy, but if they are expected to last for the  foreseeable future 
they become institutions. However, this criterion is far less useful during the transition from 
communism to capitalism, when (at least initially) almost everything was very “young” and 
short-lived, and people had few strong expectations as to the long term persistence of any 
particular arrangement.   
Under  these  circumstances,  it  may  be  more  useful  to  use  the  following 
commonsensical distinctions: Institutions are those rules that allow a very small degree of 
discretion  in  their  application.    Bureaucracies  are  organisations  that  apply  rules  and 
formulate policies. In doing so they may have more or less discretion. Policies are decisions 
made by bureaucracies in those cases in which they have a high degree of discretion.  Thus, 
a  Council  of  Ministers  (a  bureaucracy)  may  embark  on  a  policy  of  economic  reform that 
involves passing a large number of laws, some of which permit of very little discretion in their 
application  and  should  therefore  be  considered  institutions,  while  others  allow  for 
considerable discretion, and (if pursued with some minimal degree of consistency!) should 
therefore themselves be considered lower-level policies.   
Some fundamental systemic rules that may allow for the exercise of wide discretion 
by  well-defined  actors  are  also  often  called  “institutions”.    Examples  here  would  be 
constitutional review of acts of parliament by supreme or constitutional courts, or review of 
the decisions of the state bureaucracy by ordinary or administrative courts.  Another is the 
principle of private property, by which owners are allowed to dispose of their property largely 
as they wish. We will call these institutions “systemic rules”.  
All of the above come in at least two variants: economic and political. Thus, we have 
both political and economic “systemic rules”, political and economic “institutions”, political 
and economic “policies” and political and economic “bureaucracies”.   
Finally, it needs to be remembered that many “institutional” outcomes (in the widest 
sense of the term) turn out not as they were intended, and that in free societies and market 
economies a vast number of institutional outcomes are not primarily determined by the state 
or political processes, but rather by the interplay of private sector actors. Thus, for example, 
British banking law allows for the existence of German-style universal banks, which both 
                                                 
3 I am grateful to Andrzej Bratkowski for this latter suggestion. Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
serve retail customers and have close ties to industry, while until recently US banking law did 




4. Institutional transformation and transplantation in Poland in 
the early transition 
 
The years 1989-1993 were a period in which speed was crucial. The economy was in 
deep crisis before the dismantling of communism. Indeed, it was this crisis that induced the 
Communists to surrender power.  The dissolution of many communist institutions as a result 
of the loss of power by the Polish United Workers Party, as well as the dissolution of the 
Council  for  Mutual  Economic  Assistance  (Comecon),  which  had  regulated  trade  between 
communist countries, only added to the problems. Reformers and politicians therefore acted 
opportunistically,  often  following  the  line  of  least  resistance  so  as  to  make  pre-existing 
institutions “fit for purpose” under the new circumstances. 
 
Political institutions 
These were initially heterogeneous, with elements borrowed from a number of countries.  
The powers of the Presidency were modelled on those of the French V Republic: foreign 
affairs,  defence  and  internal  affairs  were  reserved  to  President  Jaruzelski,  who  also 
appointed  the  relevant  ministers.  In  this  way,  Jaruzelski  could  be  guarantor  or  Poland’s 
loyalty  to  the  Soviet  Union,  in  much  the  same  way  that  De  Gaulle  could  guarantee that 
Communists  would  never  take  France  out  of  the  Western  Alliance  unless  they  won  the 
presidency. A similar institutional set-up was later established in South Africa, when free 
elections to parliament were preceded by the transfer of the Foreign, Defence and Interior 
Ministries to the control of President De Klerk, providing a guarantee of white security for a 
further period. 
  The similarity to France was increased when Jaruzelski (who had been elected by 
Parliament) was succeeded by Lech Walesa, who was elected by direct universal suffrage.  
The voting system for parliamentary elections was also based on the V Republic model of 
two round voting, with only the top two candidates going through from  the first round to the 
second.  This system makes sense when, as in France, the political stage is highly polarised 
into two camps, both of which consist of several competing parties. The first round then 
effectively acts as a primary for the selection of the left or right wing candidate for the second 
round.  In  Poland,  however,  although  the  political  stage  was  highly  polarised  between Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
Solidarity  and  the  Communist  Party,  the  two  camps  were  not  at  this  time  internally 
fragmented into independent parties. 
  The June 1989 elections were only partly free. Two fifths of all seats in the lower 
chamber of Parliament (the Sejm) was to be freely contested. The remaining seats were to 
be contested only among the parties of the ruling coalition (the CP, the Peasants’ Party and 
the  so-called  Democratic  Party  as  well  as  CP-friendly  independents).  Again,  this  system 
recalls other cases of de-colonisation. For instance, in British colonies, when elections were 
introduced they often provided for so-called “reserved seats”.  These either involved only 
voters  of  a  particular  ethnic  group  electing their  representative,  or  alternatively  all  voters 
could vote, but only a member of the group for whom the seat was reserved to stand for 
election  to  it.    The  purpose  was  often  to  guarantee  members  of  geographically  widely 
dispersed ethnic minorities parliamentary representation that they otherwise would not obtain 
in a first-past-the-post system, but sometimes it was also to weight representation in favour 
of such minorities and away from the majority, which might be in conflict with Britain. 
 
Economic institutions.   
Among the hundreds of acts and regulations introduced or revived in the late 1980s and 
early 1990s, four stand out as particularly important. The first was the re-activation of the 
provisions of the pre-War Commercial Code regarding private companies, which fortunately 
had  been  merely  suspended,  and  not  repealed,  when  communism  was  imposed  on  the 
country in the late 1940s. This code was itself a transplant, having been largely copied in 
1934 from the German Commercial Code of 1901.  As important was the re-activation of 
fundamental  property  rights  (to  own  private  property,  to  form  partnerships).
4  These  were 
contained in the Civil Code, which had originally been transplanted from France to the Grand 
Duchy of Warsaw in Napoleonic times.  
The  second  was  the  system  of  workers  councils  (Samorząd  pracowniczy)  and  of 
workers council election of state enterprise directors. This had been introduced during the 
early 1980s, at the height of repression towards the Solidarity movement, in spite of the fact 
that workers councils were a key demand of Solidarity. Of course, during communist rule the 
freedom of workers to elect their representatives to the councils, and of the councils to act 
were  limited  by  the  activity  of  Communist  Party  branches  in  the  state  enterprises. 
Nevertheless, it sufficed to remove the Communist Parts branches from the enterprises for 
the  councils  to  start functioning  independently.  While  the  interests  of workers  (which  the 
councils  represented)  were  not  entirely  congruent  with  those  of  the  enterprise,  as  they 
                                                 
4 None of these rights had been formally abolished. Nor were the ability of physical persons and private and 
“social” legal persons to enter into binding contracts formally withdrawn either. The only problem was the absolute 
need of “socialised” legal persons to follow the instructions of their bureaucratic superiors (in Ministries or HQs of 
Federations of Co-operatives), and the very limited access of private persons to assets.   Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
tended  to  overstress  the  short-term  interests  of  current  workers  against  the  interests  of 
capital and potential or future workers, they were nevertheless able to provide some degree 
of corporate governance, and to ensure that managers were not able to steal enterprise 
assets on a massive scale.  Workers councils had first been introduced in Poland in after 
World  War  II,  then  suppressed  under  Stalinism,  re-introduced  in  1956,  then  suppressed 
again, and re-introduced again in 1982. They were a truly domestic institution, although they 
also existed in other countries, such as Yugoslavia. 
Third, came a whole host of liberalising measures: to free prices, wages, commercial 
property rents, sales and purchase of almost all goods and services, to engage freely in 
international trade, to exchange currency freely, and to use whatever currency one wished in 
domestic  trades.  None  of  these  vital  measures  can  be  said  to  have  had  any  particular 
national origin, although they were clearly inspired by a belief in free markets, which has 
recently been particularly strong in Anglo-Saxon countries. 
Yet,  what  was  probably  the  most  important  element  of  the  legal  aspect  of  the 
transformation of the Polish economy did not need to be changed at all. This was the fourth 
“institution” that made the systemic transformation possible in Poland. It was the existence of 
a clear “legislative hierarchy” and of a clear “judicial hierarchy” in the country’s legal doctrine.  
In accordance with the western legal tradition, Acts of Parliament had to be in accord with the 
Constitution,  decisions  of  the  Council  of  Ministers  (or  regulations  issued  by  the  Council) 
could only be issued on the basis of Acts of Parliament that expressly envisaged them, and 
decisions of Ministers (or regulations issued by them) could only by issued on the basis of 
Acts of Parliament or decisions of the Council of Ministers, and so on.  The moment as 
“superior” legal act was changed (for example removing the legal basis for price control in 
the  country  as  a  whole)  all  subordinate  regulations  (which  depended  on  it for their  legal 
force) automatically ceased to be binding.   
This  was  quite  different  from  the  situation  in  the  USSR,  where  the  complete 
subordination  of  the  whole  of  the  state  apparatus  to  the  Communist  Party  for  70  years, 
meant  that  regulations were  (even  formally)  issued  by  a  state  agency  on  the  basis  of  a 
decision  by  the  relevant  CP  branch,  without  reference  to  a  coherent,  nationwide  legal 
hierarchy.  As a result, when the power of the CP collapsed, regulations issued by local 
governments  and  ministries  had  often  to  be  repealed  or  reformed  one  by  one,  as  their 
authority did not depend on a “higher act”, and therefore did not automatically cease with the 
repeal or change of that act.  Reformers therefore had to hunt down thousands of pieces of 
legislation giving power over the economy to bureaucrats, and change them one at a time, a Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
massive undertaking that made a swift “jump to the market economy” far harder in the former 
USSR.
5    
In Poland also, there were of course many problems, some of them resulting from a 
failure by the courts to understand key concepts of the market economy in the usual way.  
Thus,  it  took  some  time  until  all  courts  were  willing  to  allow  newly  established  limited 
companies to spend the money they had collected as capital freely. This was because of 
practice in the 1980s (when private companies were first allowed) of treating capital in them 
as a kind of deposit which guaranteed that a firm would fulfil its obligations to suppliers and 
the tax authorities.   
Naturally, some of the institutions transplanted from the West were worse than the 
ones they replaced, even in the context of a market economy. Thus, ironically, it was the 
reformers  who  abolished  the  enterprise  wage  bill  tax  (which  was  effectively  a  flat 
employment income tax) and replaced it with a progressive income tax. This was done in the 
name of educating taxpayers to understand that state services were provided out of their 
taxes.  Subsequently  reformers  have  attempted  (unsuccessfully)  on  several  occasions  to 





5. The period of consolidation 
 
From  roughly  1992  Poland  began  to  establish  its  more  permanent  institutional 
structure. This focused mainly on the drafting and ratification of the new constitution, which 
came into force in 1997, and on the passing of a series of new laws (or amendments to old 
laws)  that  gave  institutional  expression  and  detail  to  the  principles  embodied  in  the 
constitution. 
The  main  source  of  inspiration  for  these  new  institutions  was  Germany,  and  the 
second most important was the European Union, both in that the new laws needed to be 
“future EU membership compatible” and as a direct source of  “institutional transplants”.   
                                                 
5 Even the USSR had a clear hierarchy of Criminal and Civil Courts. But in some ways it was even worse off in 
this  sphere  than  in  that  of  legislation,  as  formally  it  had  no  Commercial  Courts  at  all!  This  was  the  logical 
consequence of all production and exchange being in the hands of the state for 70 years. It made little sense for 
different state agencies to be able to sue each other. The “State Arbitration” (Gosarbitrazh) system was only able 
to decide in cases of disputes between state entities (the assumption being that in a dispute between a private 
person  and  a  state  entity,  the  state  entity  must  automatically  be  right,  unless  individuals  within  the  state 
organization had acted in an illegal – and therefore criminal - manner). In 1991 the Gosarbitrazh system was 
transformed into “arbitrage courts” available to all “legal persons”, not just state owned ones (however, they are 
not  available  to  “physical  persons”).  Over  time,  these  “arbitrage courts” developed into  the  commercial  court 




Inspired by German “ordo-liberalism”, the political structure became more similar to that of 
Germany  and  less  French.
6  Thus,  the  power  of  both  the  President  and  Parliament  were 
reduced, while that of the Prime Minister was increased.   This happened above all as a 
result of three main changes introduced under the new constitution: (1) The Prime Minister 
could now be removed only through a “constructive” vote of no confidence (by which his/her 
successor was simultaneously elected to the post).  This contrasted with the situation under 
the previous “Small Constitution” of 1992 by which the Prime Minister was required to resign 
if  he  lost  a  confidence vote,  and  it  was  only  once  this  had  happened  that  a  new  Prime 
Minister  was  elected.  (2) The  Prime  Minister  could  appoint  and  remove  Ministers  at  will.  
Under the provisions that held until the enactment of the “Small Constitution” Ministers were 
directly approved by the lower house of Parliament (the Sejm) and could only be removed if 
their dismissal was approved by the Sejm. (3) The right of the President to be consulted on 
the appointment of Ministers to the three “power” Ministries (Defence, Foreign Affairs and 
Interior) was abolished.
7   
The result of these changes was at once observable. Whereas, in the years following 
the partly free elections of 1989 Poland had experienced eight Prime Ministers in as many 
years,  under  the  1997  constitution  there  were  only  three  in  the  first  eight  years  of  its 
operation.  Two  further  very  important  “German-type”  transplants  were  strengthened  as  a 
result  of  the  following  measures:  (1)  Decisions  of  the  “Constitutional  Court”  (a  separate 
supreme court, charged with pronouncing on acts of parliament and decisions of the highest 
levels of the executive branch) which could previously be overturned by a 2/3 majority of the 
Sejm, were now made irreversible;
8 (2) Judges of the Tribunal were to be appointed in such 
a  way  as  to  have  overlapping  nine-year,  non-renewable  tenures,  so  as  to  increase  their 
political  independence;  (3)  The  independence  of  the  central  bank  was  constitutionally 
guaranteed; and (4) The composition of its interest rate setting Monetary Policy Council was 
designed so as to encourage its independence. Nevertheless, many French-type elements 
remained in the new Constitution, such as the direct (two round) elections of the President by 
voters, and the (potentially wide) use of referendums in legislation. 
 
Economic Institutions. 
In two key areas the independence of institutions was strengthened, so as to increase the 
rules-based nature of decision-making, and to help ensure macro-economic stability.  
                                                 
6  Although  it  is  worth  noting  that  German  “ordo-liberalism”  was  itself  strongly  influenced  by  American 
constitutional ideas of citizens’ rights, the division of powers and constitutional checks and balances. 
7 The super-majority required to override the Presidential veto was reduced from 2/3 to 3/5. 
8  The  legality  of  lower  level  bureaucratic  decisions  was  (and  continues  to  be)  controlled  by  so-called 
“administrative courts”, which constitute a parallel judicial hierarchy which is topped by the third “supreme court” 
the “Naczelny Sąd Administracyjny”. Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
The first was the independence and governance of the central bank, while the second 
was rules regarding the drafting of the budget, and the permitted level public sector debt.  As 
mentioned earlier, the independence of the National Bank of Poland was written into the 
1997 Constitution. Even more important, so was the composition and selection of the interest 
rate setting Monetary Policy Council. The MPC consists of the Governor (who is nominated 
by the President and approved by the Sejm) and nine members appointed for a six-year term 
that overlaps that of the Governor by three years. Three of the MPC members are appointed 
by the President, three are elected by the Sejm, and three by the Senate.   
These provisions made the NBP legally and politically one of the most independent 
central  banks  in  the  world,  comparable  to  the  European  Central  Bank.  Not  only  was  its 
independence guaranteed by the constitution (by comparison the independence of the Bank 
of England is based on an administrative decision of the Chancellor of the Exchequer), but all 
of  its  main  officers  (the  Governor,  Deputy  Governors  and  members  of  the  MPC)  are 
appointed  for  fixed  terms.  Possibly,  even  more  important,  the  members  of  the  MPC  are 
chosen  by  the  State’s  three  directly  elected  legislative  bodies  (the  Sejm,  Senate  and 
President), while the Governor is not only nominated by the President but also approved by 
the Sejm.  The democratic legitimacy of such office holders is therefore similar to that of 
those elected in other countries for fixed terms by parliaments to protect various kinds of 
citizens’ rights. Examples of such offices include the state Presidents of Germany and Italy, 
Ombudsmen  and  Chairmen  of  National  Accounting  Chambers  in  a  number  of  countries 
(including Poland), and also the President of the European Commission.  Analogously to 
these, the office holders of the NBP are charged by the 1997 constitution with maintaining 
the value of the national currency.  Thus, when a conflict arises between the central bank 
and the government over monetary policy, it is not clear which side has the greater claim to 
democratic and constitutional legitimacy.
9  Indeed, conflicts with governments in 2003 and 
2006 were decisively won by the NBP. 
  On  the  fiscal  side,  the  1997  constitution  made  it  impossible  for  Parliament  to 
increase  the  budget  deficit  above  that  originally  contained  in  the  draft  proposed  by  the 
government, and limited public sector debt to 3/5 of annual GDP. The first provision was 
again in line with German practice, which goes even further, with the German “basic law” 
forbidding deficits in excess of net public sector investment. Taken together with the Polish 
provision  that  allows  government  to  implement  the  draft  budget  even  if  it  is  rejected  by 
Parliament, this provided a huge strengthening of the government’s ability to impose budget 
discipline  in  the  face  of  a  recalcitrant  Parliament.    Indeed,  taken  together,  these  powers 
come close to those of French governments, which can pass laws (including the budget) by 
                                                 
9 For the forcefully expressed presentation of the contrary view (though one which is not strongly grounded in 
Polish constitutional realities) see Mishkin (2002). Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
decree, as long as they have the confidence of Parliament.  Such powers can be important 
for  the maintenance  of budget  discipline.  In  the  Polish  case  this  is  because  proportional 
representation has led to a fragmented Sejm in which both the opposition and junior partners 
in  the  governing  coalition  often  attempt  to  gain  popularity  at  the  expense  of  the  main 
governing party, through fiscal incontinence.
10  
The second important fiscal provision of the 1997 constitution was the limitation of 
public sector debt to 3/5 of annual GDP. This was taken directly from the criteria contained in 
the Maastricht Treaty for the adoption of the euro by EU Member States.  Taken together 
with  the  provisions  of  the  Law  on  Public  Finance  of  1998  (which  provided  for  corrective 
measures to be taken when public debt exceeded the 50% and 55% of GDP thresholds) this 
legal “straitjacket” successfully imposed a degree of fiscal discipline on the Miller and Belka 
governments  of  2001-5,  which  would  rather  have  spent  their  way  out  of  the  2001-2004 




6. Future challenges 
 
One  of  the  key  problems  associated  with  economic  decision  making  is  that  in  a 
democracy it is inevitable that politicians are only elected for a temporary period, otherwise 
their would be little scope for their accountability (through citizens ability to refuse them re-
election).  Nevertheless, this results in the danger that politicians will act opportunistically if 
they can find a source of revenue that can fund current consumption but only has to be 
repaid at a date subsequent to their departure from office (even after an initial re-election). In 
this way benefits to voters can be “front loaded”, while costs are deferred for successors to 
deal with. This mechanism can be thought of as a form of “asset stripping” of various kinds of 
implicit citizens’ rights, of whose existence voters may not be aware. A classical example is 
loose monetary policy, which initially increases aggregate demand, real output, real income 
and employment, all of which is reversed once inflationary expectations catch up with reality. 
Such a policy exploits the stability of citizens’ price expectations, which is a “social asset” 
which  is  no  longer  available  to  subsequent  governments  once  it  has  been  used  up.  
Establishing an independent central bank is a way of inhibiting such “social asset stripping” 
behaviour.    Another  example  of  a  “political  Ponzi  scheme”  of  this  kind  is  excessive 
government borrowing (something which the Polish constitutional public debt limit inhibits).  
                                                 
10 This is especially the case in the last years of a parliamentary term, when the 5% threshold of votes obtained 
for entry into the new parliament often becomes a looming threat (particularly for smaller parties).  Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
  Nevertheless, when inhibited by institutional prohibitions of this kind, it is in the nature 
of temporarily elected officials to seek out new opportunities for “mortgaging the future”.  A 
recent example in Poland has been the approval of high pensions for miners, which though 
approved in 2005, will have its largest impact on the public finances only after 2010.  For this 
reason  Bratkowski  and Rostowski  (2005)  have  proposed  the  establishment  of  a  National 
Actuarial Board (Państwowa Izba Aktuarialna) that would assess the long term impact of 
proposed spending legislation and pronounce on whether it would require offsetting revenues 
to be simultaneously provided for by legislation.
11  
Bratkowski  and  Rostowski  have  also  suggested  comprehensive  reforms  to  the 
political structure so as to strengthen budget discipline across the board. These include: (1) 
shifting to a more bi-polar political system through a reduction in the size of multi-member 
constituencies  for  elections  to  the  Sejm;    (2)  further  strengthening  the  position  of  the 
government vis-à-vis the Sejm in the budget making process (thus, for example the Sejm 
would  only  be  allowed  to  reduce  government  revenue  forecasts,  but  not  its  spending 
forecasts - which it could, however, increase - and it could only amend the provisions of the 
budget by voting measures that increase revenues or reduce expenditures as compared with 
the government submitted draft); (3) strengthening the position of the Minister of Finance  
vis-à-vis the spending Ministries (by allowing the government to reject the draft budget in its 






We shall try to answer three questions. First, to what extent was the relatively high 
level of success of the transformation of the Polish economy due to the adoption of the right 
policies, and to what extent was it rather the result of good systemic rules, institutions and 
bureaucracies  (as  defined  earlier)?    Second,  to  the  extent  to  which  the  success  of  the 
transformation in Poland was not the result of good policies, to what extent were the good 
systemic  rules,  institutions  and  bureaucracies  which  made  it  possible  new,  and  to  what 
extent did they already exist before the beginning of the transformation? Third, to the extent 
to which systemic rules, institutions and bureaucracies were new, to what extent were they 
home-grown rather than transplanted? And, if transplanted, can we say anything interesting 
about why they were transplanted from one country rather than another? 
                                                 
11 I have recently learned that a similar proposal has been made by Deputy Prime Minister Jerzy Hausner. 
12 A different approach to strengthening budget discipline in Poland is suggested by Hallerberg and von Hagen. 
Their  main  proposal  is  that  a  multi-year  “budgetary  pact”  between  the  political  parties  forming  a  multi-party 
coalition government become a part of standard political practice.   Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
  Our description of the key institutional elements in the success of the early period of 
the transformation of the Polish economy, suggests the following answers to our questions. 
First,  the  early  transformation  succeeded  in  Poland  thanks  to  daring  policies  that  were 
adopted  within  a  framework  of  either  pre-existing  or  revived  “systemic  rules”  and 
“institutions”. For example, had the “systemic rule” of “legislative hierarchy” not existed, the 
legal instruments (institutions) used to implement the new policies (free price setting, free 
international  trade,  internal  convertibility  of  the  zloty,  small  budget  deficits  financed  by 
borrowing rather than money creation, etc.) could not have been introduced successfully, 
and it is possible that as a result the policies themselves could not have been implemented 
anything like as fast as they were.  
Second,  some  completely  new  (or  revived)  systemic  rules  were  introduced,  and 
proved  vital.  They  included:  the  legal  equality  of  private  and  “social”  ownership;  a  wide 
degree  of  economic  freedom  for  individuals  and  companies;  political  freedom  and 
democracy; the rule of law rather than the “leading role of the Party”. However, the policies, 
institutions  and  systemic  rules  that  were  central  to  the  transformation  were  implemented 
almost  exclusively  using  pre-existing  “bureaucracies”  (Parliament,  the  Presidency,  the 
Council of Ministers, the Ministries, the National Bank of Poland, etc.).  In the early transition 
very few new public sector bureaucracies were created.  One of the very few that was, was 
the Ministry of “Ownership Transformation” (i.e. Privatisation) and the extent of its success 
has been seriously challenged.  
Third, in the early transition new systemic rules and institutions were on the whole 
either “home grown” (such as the system of  “workers control” of state enterprises) or when 
transplanted, of such universal application for their origin not to be easily identifiable (such as 
the legal equality of all forms of property, or the freedom of owners and producers to set 
prices). However, as we have seen, the picture is far more complicated in the field of political 
institutions, with many more apparently being transplanted from abroad (in the early period 
mainly from France and Germany).  
 
In the second period of the Polish transformation (post-1992), institution building appears to 
have played a more important role in the country’s economic success.  Indeed, one of the 
striking aspects of the story is the way in which, after having achieved a real breakthrough 
via economic liberalisation and stabilisation in the context of pre-existing (or easily adapted) 
institutions in the early transformation, the Polish political elites were able to adapt to the 
opportunity provided by a more stable economic (and indeed political  environment) post-
1992, and turn their attention to institution building (both political and economic). 
  Monetary and fiscal institutions and bureaucracies were strengthened under the 1997 
constitution and accompanying legislation. This institutional strengthening helped to reduce Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
inflation to a very low level, reduce the fiscal deficit significantly and limit the growth of public 
sector debt/GDP, which has set the framework for the resumption of rapid economic growth 
in the period after 2003. The institutional strengthening also made Poland’s accession to the 
EU easier (although weaker institutions have not kept Hungary out of the Union). On the 
political side, there was also a strengthening of the mechanism for constitutional review by 
the  Constitutional  Tribunal  (which  provides  a  framework  for  guaranteeing  all  the  other 
political and property rights of citizens) and of the position of the Prime Minister vis-à-vis 
Parliament and the Presidency. As we have seen, the new strengthened institutions were 
largely based on German “ordo-liberal” models.  
Given the present state of research, it is impossible to say to what extent the success 
of  the  “second  phase”  of  the  Polish  transformation  was  due  to  new  “institutions”  or  new 
“bureaucracies”, rather than new “policies”.
13 It certainly appears to be the case that Polish 
governments have felt constrained by the limitations on their freedom of action imposed by 
the independent state institutions (such as the NBP and the Constitutional Tribunal) which 
were strengthened the 1997 constitution, and that these constraints have on the whole had a 
positive effect as far as the quality of economic decision making and economic performance 
are concerned.




                                                 
13 Most of the key new “systemic rules” that needed to be changed for the economy to move from socialism to 
capitalism had already been introduced in the first phase of the transformation. 
14 Nevertheless, it is almost impossible to judge at this stage the relative impact of “transplanted” as opposed to 
“home grown” institutions on economic performance during this period. Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
Appendix - Modelling the effects of Institutions and Geography on Economic Growth. 
 
Diminishing returns to reproducible factors. We start with a Cobb-Douglas type production 




1- α             (1A) 
 
where the symbols have the conventional meanings. We assume that α < 1, which gives 
diminishing returns to capital and labour and constant returns to scale. With constant or 
increasing returns to capital we have endogenous growth, which we address below. The 
evolution of the economy is determined by: 
 
  ∂k/∂t =  s y(t) – (n + g + δ)k (t)                (2A) 
 
The steady state of the economy is defined by: 
 
  k* =  [s/(n + g + δ)]
1/ (1 – α)             (3A) 
 




* = ln A (0) + gt – [α / (1 –α)] ln (n + g + δ)  + [α / (1 – α)]ln s      (4A) 
 
 
Better institutions can affect the rate of economic growth in two ways. The first is through 
better incentives for agents in a given country to adopt new technologies, which gives a 
higher rate of technical change g and thus a higher long run growth rate for the economy. 
This  will  be  the  case  whether  technical  innovations  are  domestically  produced,  as  in 
advanced countries, or imported from countries at the world technological frontier as occurs 
in poorer countries.  
However, there a problem with this model: the adoption of new technologies must be 
assumed to be costless (otherwise it is a form of capital expenditure) and yet at the same 
time it is not  automatic, occurring everywhere as soon as an improvement is devised at the 
world  technological  frontier,  because  then  it  would  be  uniform  across  countries.  Bad 
institutions work in this framework to inhibit the adoption of innovations to such an extent that Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
no amount of capital expenditure will overcome this handicap, whereas good ones allow the 
innovations to be adopted without the need for any special expense.  
A second channel allows an improvement in institutions to affect growth. Such an 
improvement may increase the rate of return on capital, which increases the steady state 
level  of  per  capita  capital  for  any  given  saving  rate given  by  eq.  3A. This  increases  the 
steady state level of per capita income. To the extent that the actual level of income is now 
below the steady state (or further below it), this increases the rate of growth of output per 
capita, which is given by:  
 
γ =  λ {ln [Y(t)/L(t)]* - ln [Y(t)/L(t)]}          (5A) 
     
Another  way  of  thinking  of  this  is  that  the  increase  in  the  marginal  product  of  capital 
increases the growth rate of output/head for given increases in capital/head at the given 
saving rate assumed in the Solow model. Furthermore, if we go outside the Solow framework 
and make the savings rate endogenous and positively dependent on the rate of return on 
capital we will have an even faster increase in k and therefore in y.  
  However, in the Solow model countries that have had good institutions for a long time 
will not grow faster than those with worse institutions due to such effects via the productivity 
of capital. This is because faster growth via this channel can only occur as a result of a 
greater gap between actual and steady state income, something which is unlikely to be the 
case after particular institutions have obtained for a long period. The same is true for the 
positive or negative effects of geography, which operate in this model through the impact of 
A(0) – representing endowments – on the steady state. 
 
Constant or increasing returns. If we use a function with constant returns to broad capital 
(physical and human) we can write: 
 
    Y = AK               (6A) 
 
Then we get the growth rate: 
 
     γ = sA  – (n + g + δ)            (7A) 
 
Even if g = 0, γ will be constant as long as savings, population growth and depreciation rates 
are (and positive as long as sA > n + δ). What is more, different countries will have different 
long-term growth rates depending on the values of these rates, and there will be no tendency 
for  income  levels  to  converge.    In  this  case  any  factors  that  affect  the  savings  (i.e. Studies & Analyses CASE No.339 – Institutional Transplants in the Transformation of … 
 
 
investment) rate, be they institutions or geography (e.g. via transport costs in the latter case 
as  illustrated  by  Gallup,  Sachs  and  Mellinger)  will  affect  the  long  run  growth  rate  of  an 
economy.  
  The problem with the AK function is that it does not allow for any, even conditional, 
convergence of income levels. However, a “mixed” AK + Cobb-Douglas function will give us 
both differences in long term growth rates, which depend on the savings rate (and therefore 
may depend on institutions or geography), and shorter term convergence in income levels: 
 
     Y = AK + BK
α L
 (1- α)              (8A) 
 
Where A > 0, B > 0 and 0 < α < 1. In per capita terms the function is: 
 
    y = Ak + Bk
α               (9A) 
 
The average productivity of capital is given by: 
 
    y/k = A + Bk
 –(1 – α)             (10A) 
 
which decreases in k but approaches A (rather than zero) as k tends to infinity, so that given: 
 
γ = s y/k  – (n +  δ)            (11A) 
 
γ = s A + s Bk
 –(1 – α)  – (n +  δ)          (12A) 
 
a higher savings rate gives a higher growth of GDP/capita at a given population growth rate 
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